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The Problem of Understanding Modern Humanitarianism and its Sociological Value 
 




The character, conditions and conduct of modern humanitarianism are widely studied and 
are frequently taken up as matters for critical debate.  They form a substantial field of trans-
disciplinary inquiry (Barnett and Weiss 2008). This is identified with efforts to chart new 
conditions and formations of global civil society (Kaldor 2002; DeChaine 2005). It involves 
inquiries into emergent forms of cosmopolitan political consciousness and action (Calhoun 
2004; 2008; Delanty 2000). Moreover, many take an interest in these issues out of a 
concern to explain how humanitarian discourse along with the sentiment-fired terms on 
which it issues its moral demands operate as a political ideologies and as forces of 
 ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ?Larner and Walters 2004; Walters 2011). 
 
This article is designed as a sociological contribution to these inquiries. It further aims to 
explain the potential for humanitarianism to instruct sociological understanding; especially 
where the latter concerns itself with the harms done to people in society and how we are 
socially and culturally disposed to care for others. While outlinŝŶŐĂ ‘ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨ
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ?ŝƚĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĞƐĨŽƌƚhe value of incorporating  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ?culture and 
values into projects of social research. From the start it should be understood that by no 
means does this exclude a concern to critically analyse the language and sentimental tropes 
of humanitarianism so as to attend to their involvement in the enactment of power 
relations.  Neither does it turn a blind eye to the potential for humanitarian principles, 
policies and interventions, while presented as ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĂŶĚůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
to operate as forces of harm and oppressive discrimination. In these regards, the 
contributions of Foucauldian scholarship to our critical understanding of modern 
humanitarianism are acknowledged (Bornstein and Redfield 2010; Fassin 2011; 2012; Fassin 
and Pandolfi 2010; Kapoor 2013; Narkunas 2015; Piotukh 2015; Sokhi-Bulley 2011). At the 
same time, however, they are viewed as problematic where they commit us to an 
excessively limited conception of this phenomenon and to projects that have no other 
purpose than critique. By contrast, in the approach offered here, the unfinished (and 
perhaps unfinishable) task of understanding modern humanitarianism is taken as a matter 
that warrants the development of considerably more elaborated frameworks of theoretical 
and historical understanding. It also aims to wrestle openly with the ways in which 
humanitarian conviction and sentiment operates to incite social consciousness and with its 
potential to serve as an encouragement to care for people in social terms. In these respects, 
moreover, it works to make explicit the humanitarianism that is contained within the 
critique of humanitarianism. 
 
My argument draws ŽŶŚĂƌůĞƐdĂǇůŽƌ ?Ɛmuch-cited critical evaluation of MŝĐŚĞů&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? (Taylor 1984). Here, however, I am not so much 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚdĂǇůŽƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?s understanding of power and his argument 
that it ŽŶůǇ ‘ŵĂŬĞƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?/am more interested rather, 
with ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŶŐŽŶdĂǇůŽƌ ?s contention that, in his portrayal of humanitarianism as a 
stratagem of social control, Foucault often simplifies too much. I join with Taylor in calling 
for a more wide-ranging historical investigation of the origins and development of modern 
humanitarianism. I also aim to detail some of the contribution that sociology can make to 
this. 
 
More recently, in the context of debates surrounding the political character, organization 
and consequences of humanitarian interventions associated with the United Nations and 
related International Non-Governmental Agencies, a number of commentators have argued 
that the quality of analysis that is brought to bear upon contemporary affairs is 
impoverished due to its historical amnesia. For example, Michael Barnett argues this has 
often led to a lack of appreciation for the extent to which many of the moral contradictions, 
paradoxes and failings of contemporary forms of humanitarianism, have featured as part of 
its thinking and practice since its origins; and moreover, that these cannot be simply 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŶĂƌƚĞĨĂĐƚŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶĂĚŝƌƚǇǁŽƌůĚ ? (Barnett 
2011). Similarly, Samuel Moyn argues that a more carefully detailed history of modern 
humanitarianism, and especially one that attends, as he puts it, ƚŽŝƚƐ ‘ƉĞƌǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 ‘ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨŝƚƐƐǇŶĚƌŽŵĞƐ ? ?ŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?
organisation and novelty of global humanitarianism in the twenty-first century (Moyn 2014: 
46). This article shares these convictions. At the same time, however, in its commitment to 
the development of sociological understanding, it is not only concerned to chart the origins 
and spread of humanitarian values and ideals so as to understand how these are 
incorporated within individual social actions and institutional formations, but also to attend 
to the social conditions under which these are rendered conceivable and are made charged 
with moral authority. In this regard, it begins ƚŽƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽDŽǇŶ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚ
moves beyond debating the political and/or moral significance of the principles or 
sentiments by which humanitarianism is held to be justified, and rather, attempts to explain 
how these acquire their cultural validity and moral appeal in social experience (Moyn 2006).   
 
The opening section offers a definition of modern humanitarianism. Here I share in the 
understanding that, given the complex history of modern humanitarianism and its multiple 
manifestations in the contemporary world, it is useful to distinguish between different types 
of humanitarian action, varieties of humanitarian organisation, different ages of 
humanitarianism and contrasting forces of humanitarianism (Barnett 2011). There are many 
humanitarianisms. At the same time, however, I hold that while there are many branches to 
the modern humanitarian tree, these have familiar elements and some shared histories by 
which they connected to the same trunk; or rather, are made rooted in common ground. It 
is not easy, however, to make all this amenable to sociological understanding. This is partly 
due to the fact that we are set to deal with areas of our cultural history that remain poorly 
understood, and then again, are liable to provoke many conflicts of interpretation.  It is also 
related to the ongoing difficulties we have in making adequate sense of our emotional 
dispositions and how these have changed through modern times; and how in turn these are 
set to be configured by current social arrangements and are moderated through our cultural 
experience of the contemporary world. 
 
I am particularly interested in the potential for the many ongoing intellectual difficulties and 
moral controversies attached to the attempt at understanding modern humanitarianism to 
be made productive for thought and action. In this I attend to the involvement of modern 
humanitarianism, and especially the many controversies it generates, in debates over the 
moral character of society. I also note how these can serve as a means by which individuals 
ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ? deserving of care. I argue that we should take the 
many problems in making adequate sense of modern humanitarianism as a guide to social 
and sociological understanding. In this regard, in the middle section I contend that it is 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƌĞĂĚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐůĞŶĚŝŶg support to 
this position. In a later section I argue, however, that it may be in the work and writings of 
Jane Addams that we find the best example of how sociology might proceed to refine our 
knowledge of the social constitution of modern humanitarianism and its value. 
 
Modern Humanitarianism and Humanitarianisms  
 
There is a longstanding tradition of sociological and philosophical understanding that holds 
that modern people are particularly distinguished as such by the fact that they have 
acquired pronounced humanitarian temperaments and moral sensibilities. On some 
accounts, the origins of modern humanitarianism can be traced back to the Spanish 
colonization of the Americas in the late fifteenth century; and in particular to the moral and 
theological debates provoked in reaction to the genocidal violence visited upon Amerindian 
populations under the encomienda system of slavery (Headley 2008; McFarland 2011; 
Todorov 1984; Wright-Carozza 2003). Others are inclined to identify the well-spring of 
modern humanitarianism in some of the theologies and political movements of the 
Protestant Reformation; and here a focus is often brought to the Quakers in an attempt to 
explain how these people were first moved to protest against the cruelties done to slaves 
and how their moral convictions were subsequently corralled into sustained campaigns for 
the abolition of slavery (Abruzzo 2011: 16-49; Stamatov 2013). 
 
While during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it appears that humanitarianism 
preoccupied only a few exceptional individuals and sectarian groups, it is now widely 
recognised that through the second half of the eighteenth century it became a widespread 
and passionate concern for the new urban middle classes of Western European and 
American societies. DĂŶǇŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐƐŚĂƌĞŝŶ<ĞŝƚŚdŚŽŵĂƐ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚwhat 
appears to be an ŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬŽĨ ‘ƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐƚĞŶĚĞƌ-hĞĂƌƚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĨƌŽŵĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ? ?
onwards was widely recognised as a powerful force inspiring civic consciousness and action 
(Denby 1994; Ellis 1996; Thomas 1983: 173-5; Vincent-Buffault 1986). For example, Lynn 
Hunt argues that the 1760s in particular are distinguished by a marked increase in the 
discovery of moral feelings for the humanity of those subjected to cruel punishments. She 
notes that while at first Voltaire was moved in 1762-3 to protest against the trial of Jean 
Calas on the grounds that it took place as an act of religious bigotry, by 1766 his principle 
concerns had shifted to the morally outrageous ways in which the court had attempted to 
ƵƐĞƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨ ‘ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞǁŚĞĞů ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞĂůĂƐĐŽŶĨĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞŵƵƌĚĞƌŽĨŚŝƐƐŽŶ ?
Although such ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ‘ŚĂĚůŽŶŐƐĞĞŵĞĚĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƚŽŚŝŵ ? ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĚƵĞ
ƚŽĂƐƵĚĚĞŶƵƉǁĞůůŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚŵĂŶǇĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŽŽŬƚŽďĞ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů
ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚsŽůƚĂŝƌĞǁĂƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐ ?,ƵŶt 
2007, pp.70-6).  
 
Through the second half of the eighteenth century a  new sentiment-fired  ‘humanitarian 
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? is now understood to have inspired early modern movements to end slavery, the 
initiation of campaigns for the rights of women, the founding of moral crusades against child 
labour, and to have provoked the first worries about the suffering experienced by people as 
a result of their impoverished working and housing conditions under nascent laissez-faire 
capitalism (Fiering 1976; McGowan 1986; Pinker 2011: 155-227; Sznaider 2001).  While 
people were always selective in their attachments to particular humanitarian concerns, 
nevertheless, it is possible to identify these as all involved with what Margaret Abruzzo 




Firstly, this holds that a great deal of human pain and suffering is unnecessary and unjust; 
and that its presence in extreme forms amounts to a moral obscenity. Here there is a radical 
ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ?ŵĞĚŝĞǀĂůĂŶĚŵŽƐƚĞĂƌůǇŵŽĚĞƌŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĂŝŶƐĂŶĚ
miseries as either an inevitable part of life or as connected to the workings of Divine 
Providence. A substantial amount of human suffering is no longer viewed as part of what 
Thomas Beard in his famous work of 1597 referred to as  ‘ƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŽĨ'ŽĚ ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?
but rather, it is seen as a terrible and unwarranted misfortune (Beard 2012 [1587]). 
Secondly, it involves a new emotionally charged moral response towards pain. It is not only 
the case that most pain comes to be viewed as wholly against us and as forms of experience 
we must oppose, but also, that the spectacle of human misery excites moral sympathy. 
Individuals acquire a more pronounced capacity to feel for the suffering of others; and 
further, may be moved by this to a position of moral outrage. As Emile Durkheim observes, 
at the same time as modern people are liable to experience social pressures by which they 
are inclined towards egoism, those same pressures also appear to be implicated in the 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇĨŽƌĂůůƚŚĂƚŝƐŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌƉŝƚǇĨŽƌĂůůƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƐ ?ĨŽƌĂůů
human miseries, a more ardent need to combat them [and] a greater thirst for sŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?
(Durkheim 1973 [1898]: 49).  Thirdly, modern humanitarianism is intimately connected to 
ĚĞďĂƚĞƐŽǀĞƌǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŽďĞŚƵŵĂŶĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚŝƐďŝŶĚƐ ‘ƵƐ ?ŝŶƚŝĞƐŝŶďŽŶĚƐŽĨŵŽƌĂů
responsibility towaƌĚƐ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞ eighteenth century debates over the  ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌ
ŚƵŵĂŶĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĂƌĞ identified with a  ‘ĨĞůůŽǁ-ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ? that is explicitly recognised ĂƐ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ?
(Abruzzo 2011: 3; Mullan 1988). The moral feelings aroused in face of the spectacle of 
human suffering are taken not only as a form of social revelation, but also, as a provocation 
to question the moral meaning of human sociality and the forms it takes (Smith 2006 
[1759]). Moreover, this social sensibility and conviction, as dramatically illustrated in works 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐsŽůƚĂŝƌĞ ?ƐĂŶĚŝĚĞ ?ŝƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶĂŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŽůŽĐĂƚĞƚŚĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶ
suffering in conditions of human society; and further, for this to be addressed as a problem 
requiring us to engage in efforts of social reform (Reference to add 2016). 
 
Given the many controversies attached to contemporary forms of humanitarianism, it is 
important to recognise that, as outlined above, modern humanitarianism has always 
attracted a lot of critical debate and political contest. The putative motives underlying 
expressions of humanitarian sentiment and commitment have always been questioned and 
have often been found wanting (Moyn 2006; Smith 2006 [1759]). Moralists have 
consistently worried over the extent to which the feelings aroused by the spectacle of 
human misery hold the potential to operate more as a self-serving pleasure than as an 
incitement for people to actively care for the well-being of others (Halttunen 1995). The 
possibility that modern humanitarianism, while presenting itself as a heart-felt commitment 
ƚŽƚŚĞŐŽŽĚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŵĂǇŝŶĨĂĐƚǁŽƌŬĂƐĂŶŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?
has long been recognised (Brunstetter 2012; Muthu 2003). In these regards, in her famous 
ĞƐƐĂǇŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? when HannĂŚƌĞŶĚƚƉŽƌƚƌĂǇƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ
a justification for revolutionary violence and as a force set opposed to democratic political 
debate, then she is operating within longstanding traditions of critique (Arendt 1963). 
 
It is also important to recognise that the base sentiments and convictions of modern 
humanitarianism have been taken up within many different, contrasting and sometimes 
contradictory humanitarian practices and campaigns. Humanitarian sentiments and 
convictions may be widespread, but they are by no means universal or indiscriminate. It 
seems that the  ‘compassionate ƚĞŵƉĞƌĂŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐalways selective in its focus and highly 
varied when it comes to its expression (if at all) in social action. This is vividly illustrated by 
F. David Roberts in his study of the social conscience of the early Victorians (Roberts 2002). 
Here Roberts notes that when it came to extending humanitarian sympathies towards the 
miseries endured by the working poor, it appears that widespread evangelical Christian 
beliefs in childhood innocence allied to a bourgeois faith in the virtues of classical political 
economy led to much more humanitarian sympathy being extended to the sufferings of 
labouring children than those endured by their parents. The humanitarian sympathies of 
Victorian bourgeois philanthropists appear to have been heavily disciplined by their 
theological convictions and political beliefs (Roberts 2002: 258-95). Similarly, Frank 
Klingberg notes that while touring Britain promoting the cause of American antislavery, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe provoked a storm of protest from those campaigning to improve the 
conditions of the white working classes when she refused to recognise the plight of white 
adult  ‘ǁĂŐĞƐůĂǀĞƐ ?ĂƐ a worthy humanitarian cause. Stowe held that industrial capitalists 
ĂŶĚůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞďůĂŵĞĚĨŽƌǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚthis should be 
ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŝŶŝŶƚŽǆŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĚƌŝŶŬƐ ?ĂŶĚthe sin of intemperance (Klingberg 1938: 
551). In this instance the moral judgements that Beecher Stowe cast on the white working 
poor operated so as to make her see them as not worthy of humanitarian concern.  
 
These are just some of the many examples of historical contexts where expressions of 
humanitarianism by sentiment, word or action warrant analysis in more discrete terms. 
Insofar as it is evidently the case that modern humanitarianism can be appropriated in the 
service of many contrasting and opposing campaigns, and can be found operating within a 
wide range of institutional settings, then its various manifestations warrant explanation and 
analysis in relation to their particular forms and contexts. Modern humanitarianism is 
always blended with ideological commitments, favoured political priorities and moral 
preferences. It can, moreover, be found operating to justify a considerable range of 
behaviours and can be corralled in support of many different, and even opposing, 
institutional arrangements and political projects (Reid-Henry 2014).  The humanitarianisms 
of ĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐĨŽƌǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĐŚŝůĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? peace and 
reconciliation campaigns, health promotion, disaster aid and international development 
(and many more besides) all warrant analysis on their own terms and with due regard for 
their own distinct histories and domains (Barnett 2011; Sznaider 1997;  2001; Wilson and 
Brown 2009). 
 
Causes, Conditions and Currents 
 
We are still working to piece together an adequate understanding of the range of historical 
events, cultural developments and social processes that are implicated in the origins, 
consolidation and spread of modern humanitarianism.  While there is a tendency among 
Western scholars to attribute its origins to strands of Christian theology and pastoral 
tradition that promoted belief in a God of compassion along with the conviction that it was 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐChristian calling to practice acts of charity and kindness to all people on the 
understanding that all possess a common humanity, there is no agreement when it comes 
explaining how or why such beliefs and practices gathered wider legitimacy and appeal. It is 
recognised that this involves us in the problem of explaining why most people abandoned 
the idea that they were subject to the whims and dictates of an angry God of judgement 
ĂŶĚůŽƐƚƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵ ?ĨŽƌ doctrines of  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌ
over which a considerable conflict of interpretations reigns (Burns 2002; Cunningham and 
Grell 2000; Walsham 1999; Thomas 1971). Some argue that the prolonged extremes of 
suffering experienced by many people through the wars of religion and internecine civil 
strife that followed in the wake of the Protestant Reformation played a significant role in 
this regard (Hill 1993; Pinker 2011:172-4); and here Ronald ƌĂŶĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?article that 
suggests that the  ‘genealogy ? of the eighteenth century  ‘ŵĂŶŽĨĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ůĞĂĚs back to 
campaigns waged by Latitudinarian clergy to promote a benevolent Christianity in 
opposition to Calvinist theology and Hobbesian political philosophy, has gathered renewed 
popularity as an important part of the explanation for the modern  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?
(Asad 2011; Ellis 1994: 14; Herdt 2001; Moyn 2006). 
 
It is certainly the case that at a popular level, and especially in Britain and the United States 
of America, eighteenth century Christianity was expressed in more openly heart-felt terms, 
and that here believers grew more preoccupied with proclaiming a faith based 
humanitarianism (Clark 1995; Mack 2008; Thomson 2003). Furthermore, following Crane, 
some argue that western humanitarianism is best explained as a development within 
strands of Christian tradition, although one that, once established, had a tendency to push 
humanitarian conviction in an avowedly secular direction (Cunningham 1998; Cook 2013; De 
Bruyn 1981). Accordingly, when writers such the Third Earl of Shaftsbury, David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine subsequently appear to operate with the 
largely unquestioned assumption that humanitarian convictions sentiments are part of 
human nature and a feature of common sense, then it is argued that they are involved in 
secularising a sentimentalised form of Christianity (Himmelfarb 2001; Fiering 1976). 
 
In the domain of sociology, however, it is recognised that there is more than the mere 
appeal of a set of ideas involved in the processes whereby humanitarianism came to be 
identified with  ‘common sense ?. Attention is brought to the social arrangements in which 
people are set to live and the components of lived experience that charge tenets of belief 
with credibility.  One tradition holds that that the popularization of modern 
humanitarianism is linked to the emergence and spread of modern capitalism (Haskell 
1985a; 1985b). Accordingly, Natan Sznaider contends that  ‘ďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůĨŝĞůĚŽĨ
others with whom contracts and exchanges can be made, market perspectives extend the 
sphere of moral concern as ǁĞůů ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƵŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ?^ǌŶĂŝĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?Another 
tradition attends to the ways in which humanitarian dispositions are nurtured within social 
processes of individualization. Following Emile Durkheim it is argued that where people are 
made to live under social arrangements that make them relate to others as well as 
themselves as distinct individuals, the more psychologically disposed they are to acquire 
humanitarian conviction and moral feeling (Giddens 1971; Vogt 1993). It is observed that a 
 ‘ƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?is more likely to appeal to those living in social contexts where they 
are more heavily individualized (Cotterrell 2011; Cristi 2009; Joas 2013).  
 
In his account of the psychological and emotional transformations that accompanied the 
EuroƉĞĂŶ ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝǌŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?Norbert Elias is now widely identified as providing us with one 
of the most theoretically sophisticated elaborations of these traditions (Elias 1994 [1937]). 
Here a focus is brought to the long-term development of social mores, standards of cultural 
distinction and institutional arrangements that led people to both inhibit violent impulses 
and develop a more elevated concern with the cultivation of empathy. On this account, 
modern humanitarianism is established as the product of a set of social arrangements and 
processes of socialization. It is nurtured, promoted and accentuated within social 
 ‘ĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝt is a human potential that emerges in contexts where individuals are made 
subject to disciplinary ĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨ ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? (Linklater 2004).  In these regards, moreover, it 
might be argued that we are still piecing together an adequate understanding of the variety 
of ways in which these takes place, and for that matter, of how humanitarian passions may 
wax and wane in contexts where civilization undergoes periodic processes of 
 ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? (Ray 2013; Rohloff 2013). It is further suggested that 
while Elias has cleared the ground for us to better understand the social processes within 
which individuals are more likely to acquire humanitarian concerns, he does not go far 
enough to uncover the potential for these to be nurtured through conscious action 
(Rosenwein 2002). This has led to further calls for us to devise more analytically 
sophisticated accounts of how individuals are inspired to ĐƌĂĨƚ ‘emotiveƐ ? and how these are 
subsequently adopted within discourses of politics and public life (Reddy 2001; Spelman 
1997); and here, one might further argue that we are only just beginning to piece together 
understandings of how the moral and political currency of humanitarianism is moderated in 
relation to the production and distribution of visual imagery of human suffering 
(Fehrenbach and Rodogno 2015; Kurasawa 2013; Orgad 2013; Reference to add 2013) 
 
All these terms of debate and analytical challenges are mentioned here to establish that any 
discussion of contemporary humanitarianism is faced with a difficult task when it comes to 
understanding how it should be assessed in relation to its history.  It is not only the case that 
the origins and early development of modern humanitarianism remain somewhat obscure 
and poorly understood, but also, that much within this remains open to dispute. We are 
ĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŚĂƌůĞƐdĂǇůŽƌƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐ ‘ĂďŝŐĂŶĚĚĞĞƉƐƚŽƌǇ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽŽŶĞĐĂŶĐůĂŝŵƚŽ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ QĨƵůůǇ ?(Taylor 1984: 155).  Moreover, many parts of the story that are identified 
as holding significance invite many conflicts of interpretation. Our understanding of modern 
humanitarianism is incomplete, and a great deal of what might be taken as understood 
remains a vexed matter for debate. 
 
Contemporary Humanitarianism and Foucauldian Critique 
 
Some of the above mentioned social and cultural transformations that gave rise to modern 
humanitarianism are charted by Charles Taylor in his famous work Sources of the Self: The 
Making of Modern Identity (1989). Some reference to these is also featured in his earlier 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨDŝĐŚĞů&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?KĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌ
Taylor is the contribution that Protestantism has made to the modern  ‘ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶof 
ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇůŝĨĞ ?ĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƐĂĐƌĞĚǀĂůƵĞ and as a realm of experience that we should be 
seeking to ameliorate in a bid to combat the causes and effects of human suffering (Taylor 
1984: 155-6; Taylor 1989: 211-302).  His purpose in drawing attention to this period of 
Western cultural history appears to be twofold. 
 
Firstly, Taylor ƵƐĞƐƚŚŝƐƚŽƌĂŝƐĞƚŚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŵƵĐŚǁŝƚŚŝŶ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ
explanation of modern individuality that remains both unacknowledged and unexplored. 
Taylor argues that insofar as Foucault is interested to explain how people are made into 
modern subjects via the mobilization of humanitarian discourse and humanitarian projects 
of social reform, he should be more concerned with providing us with an historically 
elaborated account of the genealogy of modern humanitarianism. He contends that insofar 
as Foucault embarks on his historical studies from Nietzschean premises and with a concern 
ƚŽĞǆƉŽƐĞ ‘ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐŽĨƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŶŚĞĐherry picks examples to suit 
his cause; and further, Foucault ignores any evidence that might complicate or dilute his 
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?dĂǇůŽƌŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐĂƐĂ ‘terrible 
simplificateur ? (original emphasis) (Taylor 1984: 165).  Accordingly, Taylor argues that while 
a work such as Discipline and Punish (1991 [1975]) provides ƵƐǁŝƚŚĂŶ ‘ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞůǇƌŝĐŚ
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂƐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ 
domination ĂŶĚĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞŶĞw kinds of disciplined subjects, 
insofar as it does not own up to its biases, it also prevents us from recognising the potential 
ĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ‘ŵŽƌĞĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(Taylor 184: 164). 
 
Secondly, Taylor contends that in his critical standpoint and ethics Foucault is more 
indebted to Christian humanitarian tradition than he cares to acknowledge. Taylor argues 
that ultimately Foucault occupies a paradoxical position where on the one hand he aims to 
ĚĞŶŽƵŶĐĞĂůůŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂ ‘ǁŝůůƚŽƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƐ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ, by his engagement with the attempt to recount 
our history and alert us to conditions under which we acquire our social subjectivity, he 
aims to offer us a form of enlightenment. Taylor claims that there is a residual attachment 
to Christian notions ŽĨ ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? here. He asks: 
 
 ‘/ŶŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƵƐĂŶĞǁǁĂy of reappropriating our history and in rescuing us from the 
supposed illusion that the issues of the deep self are somehow inescapable, what is 
Foucault laying open for us, if not a truth that frees us for self-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?
         (Taylor 1984: 181) 
  
More recently, the first of these points has been elaborated upon by Simon Reid-Henry 
(Reid-Henry 2014). Reid-Henry argues that Foucault and those inspired by his work have not 
paid enough attention to the inherent paradoxes of western humanitarianism that result 
from the fact that at the same time ĂƐŝƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐĂƐĂ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƐĂǀŝŶŐ
individuals and improving conditions of social life, it also serves as a technique of 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨůĂŝƐƐĞǌ-ĨĂŝƌĞůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ZĞŝĚ-
Henry 2014: 428).  Accordingly, he urges us to recognise that while throughout modern 
ƚŝŵĞƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ?ŚĂǀĞĂůǁĂǇƐďĞĞŶĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĚďǇŵĂƌŬĞƚǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚ
the logic of humanitarian values have served as a justification of state intervention in 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƵƐŝŶŐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƐĞŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽ ‘ƐĞƚ
ůŝŵŝƚƐŽŶƐƚĂƚĞƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞƚĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ĂƚƚŝŵĞƐĞǀĞŶƚŽƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌĞŶĚƐ ?, as 
for example, in movements to abolish systems of slavery (Reid-Henry 2014: 428). His wider 
point here is that insofar as we cast humanitarianism purely as a political rationality that 
enforces disciplinary regimes of  ‘care ? and justifies self-serving interventions into ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
lives, then we fail to recognise the extent to which it is Ă ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐ ?ƚŚĂƚĂůƐŽ
operates to expose and oppose the harms done to people under the social and political 
systems in which they are made to live. Reid-Henry argues that modern humanitarianism 
and the many forms it takes, are frequently to be found performing more complex and 
contradictory roles in social life than Foucault and his follows are prepared to admit. These 
consist in sets of values and practices where there is always an amalgam of potentially 
beneficial and possibly harmful consequences for people. 
 
ƐĨĂƌĂƐdĂǇůŽƌ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƉŽŝŶƚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?ŝƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽ
which this has been developed under the auspices of Foucauldian scholarship, albeit 
without any concern for exploring its connections to earlier humanitarian traditions hewn 
from segments of Christianity. Among scholars of Foucault a considerable amount of debate 
now surrounds how we should interpret some of the suggestive remarks that feature in his 
1975-76 lecture course Society Must Be Defended and in his 1981 press conference 
statement ŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŽĨĨĞƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ďŽĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĨůĞĞŝŶŐ
Vietnam (Foucault 1984; 2004). The former includes a passage where Foucault states: 
 
Truth to tell, if we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary 
power, in our search for a non-disciplinary power, we should not be turning to the 
old right of sovereignty; we should be looking for a new right that is both anti-
disciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty  
                                                                                                                (Foucault 2004: 39-40) 
  
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƵƌŐĞƐƵƐƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞĂ ‘ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞrecognition that we are all 
the subjects of government, and more provocatively, to recognise that: 
 
Because of their claim to care for the wellbeing of societies, governments arrogate 
to themselves the right to treat in terms of profit and loss the human suffering which 
their decisions cause and their negligence this allows. It is a duty of this international 
citizenship to always confront the eyes and ears of governments with the human 
suffering for which it cannot truthfully be denied that they bear responsibility. 
WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŵƵƐƚŶĞǀĞƌďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶƚŚĞƐŝůĞŶƚƌĞƐŝĚƵĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?/ƚ
grounds an absolute right to stand up and to challenge those who hold power. 
                              (Foucault 1984: 22) 
 
Some take these as evidence of Foucault changing his mind, and that in his later work he 
was moving towards a position that recognised some virtue in liberal humanism (Paras 
2006). Others, while conceding that such passages demand a  ƌĞĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ
views on humanitarianism, are more inclined to argue that he was not so much concerned 
to advance a total dismissal of humanitarian conviction and action, but rather that, 
throughout his work, Foucault was principally concerned to oppose any philosophy or 
politics that operates from ƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
we should rest settled in our understanding of how we are constituted or of what it is 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƵƐƚŽĚŽ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĞŶ'ŽůĚĞƌĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ
with human rightƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ‘ĂŶĞƚŚŝĐŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
with-ŝŶĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨĂŶƵŶĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?'ŽůĚĞƌ
2010: 3; 2013). Similarly, David Campbell argues that ultimately Foucault was setting the 
grŽƵŶĚǁŽƌŬŝŶƉůĂĐĞĨŽƌĂŶĞǁ ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐĞĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ? (Campbell 1998). He argues 
that at the same time as this would operate with due regard for the potential for 
humanitarianism to cause harm  - and that here he was particularly worried by the extent to 
which a great deal of harm had resulted from efforts to justify humanitarian via the 
metaphysics of humanism  W it would also aim to revise and rework humanitarian conviction 
and sentiment against doing harm to others ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ĂŶĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘life ? and  ‘being 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ƚŚĂƚĂůǁĂǇƐĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚŽƵƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĂůƚĞƌŝƚǇ (Campbell 1998: 519).  Campbell 
argues that Foucault was ultimately urging us to recognise that we can never live, think or 
act beyond the fray of ethics and politics, and that as a matter of urgency, this requires us to 
engage with a radical humanitarian critique of humanitarianism. 
 
Here it seems that Taylor has not only raised some critical questions that call for a 
ƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŵŽƌĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚĨrame of 
reference and analysis, but also, that he has alighted on some concerns that open the door 
on to the possibility of reading Foucault as involved in an attempt to revitalise humanitarian 
outlook and understanding so that this operates with an active interest in developing an 
ever broadening conception of humanity and human possibility. On this reading Foucault 
emerges as involved in a project to charge modern humanitarianism with a more 
pronounced concern to actively struggle against forms of thought, commitments of value 
and terms of practice in which it operates to select those who should be saved and the 
causes it should defend. It seems he is not only concerned with how modern 
humanitarianism should be rendered as an object for critical thought, but also, with how it 





Sociology and Humanitarianism 
 
Contemporary debates on humanitarianism are largely dominated by academics working in 
the fields of International Relations and Anthropology; and often, these have a shared 
concern with analysing the humanitarianisms associated with the intergovernmental 
agencies of the United Nations and allied international non-governmental organization 
(INGOs) such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. Here, moreover, more often than not, it is 
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵĂƐĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐŚĞůĚƵƉĨŽƌĚĞďĂƚĞ ? 
 
As far as International Relations is concerned debate has congregated around a 
 ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŚŽůĚƐthat the founding moment of modern humanitarianism 
should be identified in the efforts may by Henri Dunant to establish a permanent system of 
assistance for the casualties of war following his shock encounter with the wounded, dead 
and dying on the battlefield of Solferino in 1859 (Barnett 2011; Skinner and Lester 2012; 
Lester and Dussart 2014).  Modern humanitarianism is narrowly conceived as a specific form 
of civil action; one guided by principles of impartiality (the quality and quantity of aid is set 
ƚŽĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚǁŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ ? ?ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇĂĚŝƌĞĐƚ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞďĞƐŝĚĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞƉĞndence (humanitarian 
actions operates above the fray of politics). On these terms, analysts proceed by charting 
the ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĂŝŵƐŽĨŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƵŶĂŶƚ ?ƐŚĞƌŽŝĐmission have been 
corrupted by new imperatives and agendas. Our attention is directed to the 
institutionalization of humanitarianism within state-like organizations and its incorporation 
within the apparatus of inter-state relations and interventions (Barnett 2010-173-97). It is 
argued that through these processes its moral character and social functions have been 
radically transformed; and here most are preoccupied with debating the extent to which the 
humanitarianism that originated with the founding of the Red Cross now operates within 
institutional forms and to political ĂŐĞŶĚĂƐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƐĂŬĞƵŶĂŶƚ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůǀŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŝĚĞĂůƐ ?
Humanitarianism is cast under suspicion, and in some quarters even denounced, as a set of 
corrupt political movements caught within a spiralling crisis of legitimacy (Barnett and Weiss 
2008; 2011; Reiff 2002). 
 
Most contemporary anthropological studies of humanitarianism share these 
understandings, but here there has been a greater concern with exposing the ways in which 
particular practices of humanitarian aid and intervention operate to impose hierarchies of 
value upon human life; so it is made clear that what might present itself as operating on the 
basis of universal claims of humanity, is in fact the imposition of a culturally favoured and 
possibly neo-colonial way of life on people (Abu-Lughod 2002; Davey 2015; Redfield 2010). 
Moreover, more recently, a great deal of this has drawn to a focus on how humanitarian 
organisations and individuals negotiate with the ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞƐĂŶĚ the 
terms by which they hold themselǀĞƐƚŽďĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞƚŽ ‘ƐĂǀĞ ? ? ‘ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ? 
(Fassin 2007; 2012; Marsland and Prince 2012; Redfield 2005; Ticktin 2011).  Under these 
aims, as in their review of the field Paul Redfield and Erica Bornstein observe, 
 ‘ĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŽĨƚǁŽŵŝŶĚƐǁŚĞŶŝƚĐŽŵĞƐƚŽ “ŐŽŝŶŐŐŽŽĚ ? Q ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ
comfortable with the stance of critique than that of endorsement (Redfield and Bornstein 
2010: 21). 
 
Some sociologists readily align themselves with these critical projects, and chart further 
avenues of critical inquiry of their own (Calhoun 2004; 2008; Krause 2014). However, I take 
the view that by no means are these sufficient for the task of opening modern 
humanitarianism up to sociological insight; and further there is a danger here that in setting 
humanitarianism purely as a matter for critique, we fail to recognise the extent to which, 
nevertheless, it remains a vital element in our attempts at human understanding and in the 
critical thinking that seeks to advance this as a common cause. 
 
On the perspective taken in this article, humanitarianism is a more complex and variable 
phenomenon than is often recognised in contemporary International Relations and 
Anthropology. Its analysis should not be confined to the institutions and practices of the 
international humanitarian order of the last hundred years. But what is at stake here? Along 
with Simon Reid-,ĞŶƌǇ/ĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐǁŝƌůŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĂƚ
make up the domain of humanitarianism in our own era without first graspinŐ QŝƚƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
variations and underlying continuities (Reid-Henry 2014: 422). I further stand with Samuel 
Moyn in the view that if we are to seriously grapple with the problem of reforming 
humanitarianism, then we need to work at uncovering the long histŽƌǇŽĨŝƚƐ ‘ƉĞƌǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ƐǇŶĚƌŽŵĞƐ ? so as to work at understanding how these have always been a part of its 
politics and practices (Moyn 2014: 46). At the same time, however, I want to suggest that 
there is a more important point to make here beyond declaring that in order to set current 
forms of humanitarianism into analytical relief we need devise more carefully elaborated 
accounts of their histories and the histories of their commonalities and variations.  
 
One of the most important insights to draw from sociology, and especially that which takes 
theorists such as Durkheim and Elias as its guides, is that modern humanitarianism and its 
cultural enactments are both nurtured within and sustained by embodied forms of social life 
and modes of human sociality. In contemporary debates there is a tendency to treat 
humanitarianism as no more than a form of ideology and politics. It is acknowledged that 
humanitarian ideals and practices might be taken up within diverse and contrasting 
institutional arrangements and that they might be directed towards a range of different 
causes, but they are essentially identified as products of moral principle, political philosophy 
and heroic example. Humanitarianism is addressed as an idealism. Accordingly, while a 
focus is brought to how humanitarian ideals conduct social actions and may be incorporated 
within the design of social institutions, we are not encouraged to understand how they exist 
as expressions of our social situation and as products of our social constitution. 
 
Durkheim and Elias provide us with some broad-scale theoretical explanations of the ways 
in which humanitarian convictions and sentiments result from moral forces of social life and 
processes of socialization. While there is no doubt that they may be consciously cultivated 
and are taken as the inspiration for individual social actions, at the same time, it is 
recognised that they are rooted in social conditions that are prior to and exceed any 
individual sphere of action or institutional context. We may critically question humanitarian 
ideals and the ways in which these are set into practice, but the wider point here is that 
such ideals and practices are representations and expressions of a fundamental social state 
that cannot simply be adopted or set aside as a political choice. Moreover, in many 
instances this will involve us in many conflicts of value and interest; and as far as 
humanitarianism concerned this is bound to happen, for here it is often the case that 
human life itself is at stake.  
 
In traditions of classical sociology, arguably, it is Jane Addams who goes furthest to identify 
social inquiry with humanitarianism; and, as she puts it, with the understanding that under 
conditions of modernity there is Ă ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĞŵďŽĚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŝŶ
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?ĚĚĂŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: 41) tŚŝůĞƚŚŽƐĞĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĚĚĂŵƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶthe 
Hull-House social settlement may readily recognise that this involved her in the practice of 
 ‘ĚŽŝŶŐƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂƐĂĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĐĂƌĞŐŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
be forgotten that her practice was also informed by a great deal of critical sociological 
thought (Deegan 1988). Addams understood social life to consist in enactments of 
substantive human values, and on these grounds she worked under the conviction that any 
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĐĂƌĞĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŚĂƌĚƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚŵŝƐĞƌŝĞƐǁĂƐset to aggravate conflict. More 
recently Erik Schneiderhan has reminded us that in works such as Democracy and Social 
Ethics (2002 [1902]) Addams advocated a method of social investigation that actively 
courted the many  ‘ƉĞƌƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĂƌŝƐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐůĂƐŚĞƐŽĨŵŽƌĂůŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
beliefs, class interests and political perspective (Schneiderhan 2011). She advocated the 
practice of a humanitarian sociology that also sought to make itself vulnerable to and 
discomforted by critique; and especially from those that were the subjects of its care. 
Addams lived among and shared in the problems of the people that she cared for, and at 
the same time, through the many public meetings and gatherings at Hull-House she 
encouraged them to critically question her humanitarian motives, the values she 
incorporated within her terms of social understanding and the communal value of her 
activities. She practiced a humanitarianism that aimed to make itself consciously alert to the 
contingencies of its social conditioning and its inherent cultural prejudices; and further, to 
the fact that along with the rest of social life, it needed to always remain open to 
progressive democratic reform. 
 
Addams has left many questions in her wake relating to the viability of her sociology and 
whether it could or should ever be rehabilitated ĂƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ 
academy (Reference to add 2016). However, if we are prepared to take her seriously then 
she challenges us to approach the experience of humanitarian conviction and of carrying 
this through into action as a means to critically reflect upon the social conditions under 
which we are made to live. She advocates a praxis that, by involving us in how society takes 
places as an enactment of substantive human values, aims to equip us with the moral 
experience that is required for us to critically reflect on it as such. The experience of 
attempting to work with people to improve the social conditions of their existence is taken 
as necessary for the development of our sociological understanding. Humanitarian practices 
and cultures are not only approached as objects for critical sociological investigation, but at 
the same time, in all their inherent difficulties and contradictions, they are also held to be a 
necessary part of sociology; for in these one is set to encounter both how social life is made 




Over the last thirty years the gathering of academic interest around the topic of 
humanitarianism has grown exponentially. Within the social sciences and humanities, it is 
now a substantial field of trans-disciplinary inquiry. This is indicative of significant changes 
that have taken place in the political currency of social problems as well as in the configuration 
of disciplines within the academy and priorities set for research. The study of 
humanitarianism not only serves as a means to chart new conditions of global civil society, 
but also, to document emergent forms of cosmopolitan political consciousness and action 
(Barnett 2011; Moyn  2010; 2014; Calhoun 2008). It is further understood to provide us with 
important insights into mechaŶŝƐŵƐŽĨŐůŽďĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ŶĞǁĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?
and the human values at stake in the attempt to realize effective political communities (Fassin 
2012; Lechte and Newman 2012). 
 
Here it is generally recognized that when set to debate the character and conditions of 
modern humanitarianism, we are also made to question the terms under which we assign 
value to human life and how we negotiate with the moral responsibilities we bear towards 
others. This concerns our understanding of the causes and effects of human suffering and 
how we should venture to care for the harms that are done to people. At the same time as it 
ĚƌĂǁƐĚĞďĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞ ?
it also involves us in questioning the moral state of our humanity; and often with the effect 
of uncovering uncomfortable truths relating to our guiding assumptions and how our conduct 
affects others.   
 
In a largely forgotten article published in 1884, Lester Frank Ward, the first president of the 
American Sociological Association, urges his colleagues to take all this seriously as matters 
for sociological investigation. Here advises ƚŚĞŵŶŽƚƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?
as of no importance and further urges them to reject the narrowly conceived intellectualism 
ƚŚĂƚƚƌĞĂƚƐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵĂƐŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂ ‘ĨĂŶĂƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ĨŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?By working to 
ŵĂŬĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ‘ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŽĨĚĞĞƉƐƚƵĚǇ ?tĂƌĚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ that here the ultimate 
goal of sociology should be to guide society towards an understanding of how it might prove 
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ‘ĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĐĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞŽĨŝƚƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚƐŚĂůůŶŽƚ
ǁŽƌŬĚĞŵŽƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?tĂƌĚ 1884: 571).  This article shares seeks to repeat this call and 
further advance this aim, however, it does so with the recognition that there is still much to 
resolve by way of sociological understanding and within our terms of scholarly critique. 
 
I do not claim to have resolved much here, but I hope that I have begun to clear the way for 
critical thinking about modern humanitarianism to proceed with a greater wariness of its 
tendency to operate in a mode of denunciation. Indeed, it might be argued that, while 
Foucault may provide the many critics of modern humanitarianism with the intellectual 
ammunition to expose the political rationalities at work in its will to care, he also sought to 
problematize the activity of critique itself. Andreas Folkers reminds us that in his later work 
Foucault had begun a genealogy of critique; and here he claims that FouĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ public 
statements in support of the humanitarian cause of the Vietnamese boat people was, 
amongst other things, charged by a concern to distance himself from a culture of academic 
critique that sought to remove itself from real life political concerns. Folkers argues that 
towards the end of his life Foucault was searching for new ways to marry critique with 
critical practice, so that it ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ‘ŝƚƐǀĂůĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵĂƉƵƌĞůǇĚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞƚŽĂŵŽƌĞ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌ ? ?&ŽůŬĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
Here I have argued that we should approach modern humanitarianism as a constituent part 
of the moral condition of modern societies and as an aspect of our social being and politics 
that we are still very much grappling to understand. In these regards, I hold that we may still 
ůĞĂƌŶĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůĨƌŽŵ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨŝŶƋƵŝƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ
however, I hold that there is much more for the sociology of humanitarianism to grapple with 
here; and further, that we may have hardly begun to appreciate the vital significance of 
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